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Das Lernen der Philosophie ist wirklich 
ein Rückerinnern.Wir erinnern uns, 
daß wir die Worte wirklich auf diese 
Weise gebraucht haben  
(Wittgenstein, Big Typescript §89). 
 
Any discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophical 
thought would be incomplete without taking notice of the 
method he employs.  Often criticized for his style and 
organization, many feel that they are indicative of his state 
of mind; that such a lack of rigid argumentation betrays an 
inadequacy within the arguments themselves.  However, 
criticism of Wittgenstein along these lines only serves to 
demonstrate a superficial reading of his texts.  Not simply 
content (or even able) to just present us with the results of 
his investigations, Wittgenstein coaxes the reader into 
taking up an investigation of his own by means of an open 
dialogue.  As a dialogue, we are not confronted with a 
traditional argumentative structure, i.e. the stating of 
theses and their subsequent defense.  Rather, 
Wittgenstein attempts to draw the reader away from the 
obvious by means of an indirect method of discourse. 
At first, the term method might be considered 
suspect.  However, as I am using the term, "method" does 
not describe a singular approach to all problems, but 
serves as a general heading, under which a variety of 
different approaches are utilized for a variety of different 
kinds of problems.  What remains constant throughout is 
Wittgenstein's lack of traditional philosophical 
argumentation, which is replaced by a constantly shifting 
perspective in relation to the philosophical problem at 
hand; the goal of which is to dislodge or disorient the 
reader from his previously held notions.  Here, one 
recognizes Wittgenstein's appreciation for Kierkegaard 
extended beyond his profound religious and philosophic 
insights to his style and method. 
No, an illusion can never be destroyed directly, and 
only by indirect means can it be radically removed.  If it 
is an illusion that all are Christians - and if there is 
anything to be done about it, it must be done indirectly, 
not by one who vociferously proclaims himself an 
extraordinary Christian, but by one who, better 
instructed, is ready to declare that he is not a Christian 
at all (Kierkegaard, pg. 24). 
 
Wittgenstein, in much the same way as 
Kierkegaard, thought that any attempt to confront 
philosophy directly, i.e. through traditional means of 
argumentation, is already doomed to failure.  Both held 
that arguing in this fashion was, in a sense, to succumb or 
expose oneself to the very illness they were attempting to 
remedy.  Here, "the first step is the one that altogether 
escapes notice…the decisive movement of the conjuring 
trick has been made, and it was the very one that we 
thought quite innocent" (Wittgenstein, PI §308).  "We 
predicate of the thing what lies in the method of 
representing it" (Wittgenstein, PI §104).  As these 
passages point out, to utilize direct forms of argumentation 
would be a form of self-refutation. 
Being denied access to the more traditional forms 
of argument, Wittgenstein proceeds to survey problems 
from many different vantagepoints (although never in a 
direct manner), in an attempt to undermine rather than 
refute a given position.  Since he cannot 'prove' 
philosophical positions wrong, he must demonstrate how 
this single-track mindset is inherently problematic.  We 
must come to recognize for ourselves the "glasses" we 
unintentionally wear are responsible for our skewed 
relationship to the world, which tends to result in 
philosophical problems.  We cannot simply give up the 
glasses, nor can we 'trade' them in for a better pair; for this 
kind of thinking presupposes that there is a 'better' pair 
somewhere out there.  Instead, we must come to terms 
with the pair we already have; and this means the 
philosopher needs to give up his remote or disconnected 
view of the world. 
Wittgenstein regards this perspectival misrelation 
between philosopher and world to be highly individualized, 
in that the misrelation does not apply to everyone in 
exactly the same way.  For philosophy is not something in 
which individuals could partake in as one would a game of 
chess; rather Wittgenstein understands philosophy as what 
the philosopher 'does' [macht] when he loses his way 
within language.  Here, the term philosophy designates 
something quite specific, and by giving the term a much 
narrower usage than perhaps warranted, Wittgenstein 
reserves this term for philosophy "traditionally" conceived.  
By traditional philosophy, Wittgenstein means those 
"philosophies" that do not understand the different 
functions of language, and thus never gain perspective of 
what they are actually doing.  These approaches tend to 
be highly speculative, rigidly a priori logical in nature, and 
Wittgenstein thought, were very often typified by his earlier 
Tractarian view. 
Lacking an understanding of how language works, 
the philosopher is prone to 'seeing' problems that require 
solving, because he does not know the proper use of 
words in question.  The philosopher does not see the 
sheer variety and richness present in our languages; that 
language is not one homogeneous whole.  Rather, it is 
comprised of an indeterminate number of language-games 
that reach every aspect of our lives.  These language-
games are based upon our different human activities, 
which constitute not only our experiences, but our 
existence as well.  They come into and go out of existence 
corresponding to the changes in shared human activities.  
One consequence of this complex web is that the 
philosopher's error could be the result of any number and 
combination of language-games, thus complicating any 
attempt to untangle them.  It also means, as Wittgenstein 
contends, that no one approach (to use one of his most 
beloved metaphors) could be used to successfully treat 
most, let alone all, cases.  Every treatment/approach 
would have to be individualized to address the specific 
ailment under which the philosopher suffers.  To this end, 
Wittgenstein utilizes an indirect method of discourse to 
guide the philosopher on his journey toward "getting a 
handle" on the problem.  "The same or almost the same 
points," Wittgenstein writes, " were always being 
approached afresh from different directions, and new 
sketches made" (Wittgenstein, PI, Preface).  This criss-
crossing all through language and thought affords one the 
opportunity to encounter a problem from multiple 




perspectives, and the possibility of getting clear about 
them. 
But was I trying to draw someone's attention to the fact 
that he is capable of imaging that? - I wanted to put 
that picture before him, and his acceptance of the 
picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a 
given case differently: that is, to compare it with this 
rather than that set of pictures.  I have only changed 
his way of looking at things (Wittgenstein, PI §144). 
 
Wittgenstein's later work is not an attempt to free 
others from the task of thinking.  I contend that his 
intention is to put the philosopher on his own path of 
inquiry; making available a method capable of providing 
the 'clear view' (following Stern's interpretation) necessary 
for such a shift.  This change of perspective is not an 
easily accomplished feat; for our "craving for generality" 
exerts a powerful grasp on us.  This constant movement 
helps jostle us loose from what can be that hardest to see, 
i.e. that which is directly in front of our faces.  Wittgenstein 
contends that we take for granted what we are given, our 
primary assumptions upon which we build our worldview, 
effectively blinding us to the ramifications of our 
misrelationship.  This is why the investigation must 
proceed in this way, because we have a tendency towards 
settling down into a perspective.  While this last 
characterization would apply to many figures in the canon, 
Plato, Aristotle, and Husserl to name a few, what 
distinguishes Wittgenstein is his emphasis upon language. 
A main source of our failure to understand is that we 
do not command a clear view of the use of our words. -
- Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity.  A 
perspicuous representation produces just 
understanding which consists in 'seeing 
connexions'…[this is significant for us, because] it 
earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look 
at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?) (Wittgenstein, 
PI §122). 
 
To what end does Wittgenstein invoke this 
investigation of language as a critique of philosophy?  This 
is a difficult question to answer, because he intended his 
critique to be open-ended, i.e. to be commenting on many 
different problems and issues.  And while there is no one 
specific problem, most of the problems do share 
something in common i.e. an inadequate understanding of 
language. As mentioned in the quotation above, our lack of 
perspicuity [Übersichtlichkeit] has the tendency to leave us 
locked into a way of looking at things.  In order to counter 
this effect, Wittgenstein needs to break us free or "turn our 
whole examination round" (Wittgenstein, PI §108). 
The problems encountered in philosophy are really 
only grammatical fictions of our own creation.  As 
mentioned earlier, these grammatical fictions or illusions, 
do not stem from mere inattention, but instead result, in 
part, from "our craving for generality…our preoccupation 
with the method of science" (Wittgenstein, Blue & Brown, 
pg.18).  Philosophers get caught up in a certain way of 
looking at things, with a particular grammatical picture.  In 
so doing, they inadvertently lay down the groundwork to 
misinterpret these pictures as representing reality; the 
nonsense that such a mistake generates is germane to 
philosophy.  But why only philosophers? 
While it seems entirely possible for someone in 
another profession to confuse different language-game 
applications, philosophy does not dispute the objectivity 
and eternality of its subject matter.  The philosophical 
truths, regardless of difficulty in stating, possess an 
objective status.  Philosophers who operate under this 
directive proceed to do philosophy with a definite 
conceptual model in mind -- the "scientific" model of 
philosophy.  J.C. Edwards recounts the distinctive features 
associated with this model.  First, philosophy's goal is the 
development of theories capable of collecting information 
(philosophical truths) in an objective manner consistent 
with those of the "hard" sciences, e.g. physics and 
chemistry.  Second, since the information uncovered is 
objective in nature, we should be able to build upon them 
as in the sciences.  Lastly, philosophy should be capable 
of giving explanations, as well as, descriptions regarding 
our conceptual understanding of the world.  On this view, 
traditional philosophy should be a discipline able to solve 
problems -- uncovering the truths hidden from us.  
Although clearly having analytic philosophy in mind, 
Wittgenstein's critique has much further reaching 
consequences, e.g. Plato's doctrine of the Forms or Kant's 
notion of the 'thing-in-itself.'  While the problems of science 
are solved through empirical analysis, philosophical 
problems are deemed logical ones.  Through logical 
analysis, utilizing objective truths, we would be able to 
overcome the difficulties. 
Wittgenstein, however, rejects the underlying 
assumptions of traditional philosophy.  This idea of 
"philosophy as science" seems right only if we accept that 
our problems, as well as language, function in only one 
way.  We see how the sciences collect data, form 
hypotheses, and in turn, solve their problems.  
Philosophers are under the mistaken conception that all 
problems are of the same kind; thus they believe that a 
similar method is required -- understanding them to be 
solved in the same manner. 
Philosophers constantly see the method of science 
before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask 
and answer questions in the way science does.  This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads 
the philosopher into complete darkness.  I want to say 
here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to 
anything, or to explain anything.  Philosophy really is 
'purely descriptive' (Wittgenstein, Blue & Brown, pg. 
18). 
 
Unlike science, Wittgenstein believes the task of 
philosophy should be to assemble reminders regarding the 
way different language-games operate.  For there are no 
true "problems" in philosophy, only confusion about how 
our language works.  "A philosophical problem has the 
form: 'I don't know my way about'" (Wittgenstein, Big 
Typescript, §89).  When a philosopher is confronted with, 
for example, unfamiliar language-games, he has little or no 
understanding of their actual applications.  However, he 
does have knowledge of how other disciplines (language-
games) deal with difficulties, i.e. how science deals with 
problems, and analyzes the problem along these line; and 
this is precisely where the trouble begins.  Wittgenstein 
characterizes the philosopher's mentality with a rather 
unflattering image.  "When we do philosophy we are like 
savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of 
civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then 
draw the queerest conclusions from it" (Wittgenstein, PI 
§194). 
The only way to resolve the philosopher's 
predicament, to regain his perspective, is to show him how 
the word is used in the proper language-game(s), and 
hence in the language as a whole.  Once the philosopher 
is oriented as to how a language-game operates, in the 
same way as giving someone a map, they are no longer 
troubled, and the problem disappears.  We are not merely 
presenting "remarks on the natural history of human 
beings" (Wittgenstein, PI §415), we are gaining insights 
into our language, which should serve as cathartic ends, 
and not symptomatic beginnings. 
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